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level, the many sensible objections (financial,
environmental, social) to the continuing
widespread popularity of big, high-powered
pick-up trucks and mammoth SUV’s have
done little to stem their sales in North Amer-
ica. Consequently, as Foster recognizes, the
question of whether productivism will be
replaced by no-growth or de-growth policies
must remain politically unresolved for the
present.
Never Enough: Capitalism and the Progressive
Spirit, by Neil Gilbert. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016. 219 pp. $29.95 cloth.
ISBN: 9780199361335.
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Neil Gilbert’s chief aim in Never Enough:
Capitalism and the Progressive Spirit is to
challenge misconceptions about poverty,
inequality, intergenerational mobility, and
social policy. There are many, and the book
provides an array of useful correctives. It
should be required reading for stratification
researchers.
A related but distinct mission of the book is
to argue that progressives, including many
left-leaning academics, are wrong to believe
that poverty, inequality, and mobility are
big problems in the world’s rich nations. Gil-
bert sees this belief as built into the progres-
sive worldview: ‘‘Inspired by utopian ten-
dencies and a passion for equality that fuels
a perpetual search for disparities, the pro-
gressive spirit is temperamentally discontent
with the current state of affairs. In the con-
stant quest for a better future, progressives
are inclined to discount past achievements
that quickly form the status quo. In this sense,
their glasses are always half empty’’ (p. 9).
This is accentuated, he says, by electoral con-
cerns: If left parties have no further problems
to solve, how can they convince people to
keep voting for them?
Is Gilbert correct that ‘‘while these prob-
lems have not been entirely resolved, they
are far less serious than contemporary
progressive claims would have the public
believe’’ (pp. 11–12)? Consider poverty.
According to the government’s official mea-
sure, 13.5 percent of Americans are poor (as
of 2016). In the early 1960s, government
researchers took an estimate of the average
cost of nutritionally adequate meals and
multiplied this by three, because data sug-
gested a typical household spent about
a third of its income on food. That dollar
amount became the poverty line. Updated
for inflation, today it’s about $12,500 for a sin-
gle adult and $19,500 for a household with
one adult and two children. The poverty
rate is calculated as the share of Americans
who live in a household with an income
below that line.
Gilbert contends that this overstates the
share of Americans who are genuinely poor.
He points out that surveys of household con-
sumption find that people with low incomes
tend to purchase more than their income
would allow, which is due partly to borrow-
ing but also suggests some underreporting
of income. In addition, he says, some people
with low incomes have amenities such as
cars, televisions, and air conditioning.
He also notes that many people who are
counted as poor in a given year are there
only temporarily. Their income has dropped
due to short-term job loss or injury or some
other circumstance. The share of Americans
who are chronically poor, according to Gil-
bert, is likely between 2 and 7 percent.
Gilbert argues that poverty should no lon-
ger be seen as chiefly a problem of low
income. Instead, he says, ‘‘when we look
more closely, we see a chronic poverty prob-
lem restricted largely to people with physical
and psychological conditions that make it
difficult to engage in productive activities—
people in need of intense services, rehabilita-
tion, and care. From this perspective, not
only does the size of the problem become
more manageable, but the solutions take on
a different hue from those mainly seeking
to provide additional cash for low-income
people’’ (p. 29).
These points have merit. But they don’t
convince me that poverty is no longer a big
problem, nor that additional income trans-
fers aren’t needed.
For starters, the official poverty line isn’t
an especially sensible one. Suppose the U.S.
government had established a poverty line
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in 1863. No one thinks it would make sense to
simply extend that dollar amount (adjusted
for inflation) to the present. Yet that’s what
we’ve done with a poverty line set in 1963,
more than half a century ago. Incomes and
living standards for ordinary Americans
have increased significantly since then.
Should we not adjust our thinking about
what level of income reflects poverty?
Imagine what it feels like to live in the con-
temporary United States with an annual
income of $20,000, which is the average
among three-person households in the bot-
tom 20 percent of the income distribution.
Yes, you may have a car, TV, and air condi-
tioning. But that car is likely a pretty old
one, and you may not be able to afford to
run the air conditioning in your apartment
or mobile home very often. Your children’s
clothing comes from second-hand stores. If
you live in one of the many states with restric-
tive criteria for Medicaid eligibility, you prob-
ably don’t have health insurance. And you
likely have no savings to turn to if something
goes wrong, which means you are constantly
one car accident or extended illness away
from eviction. When the Federal Reserve
recently asked a sample of 5,000 Americans
how they would pay for a hypothetical emer-
gency expense totaling $400, more than
a third said they would be unable to pay for
it with cash or money in their bank account
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2015, pp. 18–19).
Moreover, data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) coupled
with ethnographic work by William Julius
Wilson, Kathryn Edin and Luke Shaefer, Mat-
thew Desmond, and others tell us that there is
deep material deprivation in the United
States. Christopher Jencks (2016), who is
attentive to the pitfalls of survey data on the
incomes of the poor, concludes that approxi-
mately 1 percent of American families with
children and 4 percent of those without chil-
dren have, for at least three months during
a year, an income of less than $2 a day. That
includes food stamps, Earned Income Tax
Credit payments, and housing support they
receive.
Should we worry about low income only
when it is long lasting? And should
antipoverty efforts concentrate on provision
of services for low-income Americans with
psychological and physical disabilities rather
than on boosting incomes? Recent research
suggests that scarcity overloads our brains
with concern about how we’ll make it
through the day or week, impeding long-
term goal setting and short-term goal seek-
ing. Temporary poverty can thereby beget
chronic poverty. In any event, there are plen-
ty of Americans for whom low income isn’t
temporary. Using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), Mark Rank, Thomas
Hirschl, and Kirk Foster (2014) calculate
that 10 percent of Americans spend ten or
more years between the ages of 25 and 60
with an income below 1.5 times the poverty
line. Greg Duncan, Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest,
and Ariel Kalil (2010) have found that for
American children growing up in the 1970s
and 1980s, an increase in family income of
just $3,000 during a person’s first five years
of life boosted earnings in adulthood by
nearly 20 percent on average.
Many of us believe the least well-off should
have not only decent incomes but incomes
that rise over time as the country gets richer.
In principle, economic growth can lift the
incomes of the poor via rising earnings, but
in many of the world’s affluent nations the
earnings of low-end households haven’t
increased much since the late 1970s. This
owes to technological advance, globalization,
union weakening, and other economic devel-
opments that are unlikely to reverse. As
a result, increases in government transfers
have been the main source of increases in
incomes for low-end households. Boosting
incomes has thus become more important
for poverty alleviation, not less.
Despite these misgivings, I heartily recom-
mend Never Enough. Gilbert’s aim to spark
greater introspection and rigor among schol-
ars of poverty, inequality, and mobility is
laudable, and the book is a helpful contribu-
tor to that goal.
References
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
2015. ‘‘Report on the Economic Well-Being of
U.S. Households in 2014.’’
Reviews 711
Contemporary Sociology 47, 6
Duncan, Greg J., Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest, and
Ariel Kalil. 2010. ‘‘Early-Childhood Poverty
and Adult Attainment, Behavior, and Health.’’
Child Development 81:306–25.
Jencks, Christopher. 2016. ‘‘Why the Very Poor
Have Become Poorer.’’ New York Review of
Books, June 9.
Rank, Mark, Thomas Hirschl, and Kirk Foster.
2014. Chasing the American Dream. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Modernity and the Jews in Western Social
Thought, by Chad Alan Goldberg. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2017. 226
pp. $35.00 paper. ISBN: 9780226460550.
DANIEL CHIROT
University of Washington-Seattle
chirot@uw.edu
Despite the many thousands of books writ-
ten about why Jews have played such an
outsized, mostly negative role in the imagi-
nation of Christians and Muslims, it still
remains somewhat puzzling because there
have never been that many Jews. The facts
are well established. Christians thought that
Jews should have recognized Christ as their
savior, and Muslims wanted Jews to accept
Muhammad as God’s greatest and final
prophet. Many did one or the other, but those
who resisted remained forever suspect as
familiar but alien interlopers who are forever
damned because they did not.
Those of their descendants who became
mercantile middlemen and urban artisans
for many generations were able to take
advantage of capitalism better than most
peasants or noble warriors so that in the
industrializing West this advantage made
Jews particularly visible as carriers of capital-
ism. This success plus the Jews’ traditional
emphasis on being literate allowed many to
become professionals and intellectuals once
they were emancipated. Combined with pri-
or religious prejudice, this relative success
made Jews ideal modern scapegoats who
could be blamed for all the sins of disruptive
modernization. To this was added the misin-
terpretation of Darwinian theory that turned
Jews into polluters of healthy races who had
to be exterminated to prevent them from
insidiously infecting and mongrelizing the
superior pure nations.
Chad Alan Goldberg’s interesting Moder-
nity and the Jews in Western Social Thought
cites many of the best works on why this
happened but takes a more specialized and
focused look at how the analysis of the
Jews’ situation became a key analytic con-
cern for the founders of sociology in France,
Germany, and the United States. He pays
particular attention to Marx, Durkheim,
Sombart, Simmel, Weber, and to the leaders
of the early twentieth-century Chicago
school: Thomas, Park, Wirth, and Stonequist.
His conclusion is that Jews came to symbol-
ize vastly contradictory aspects of moderni-
ty. For Sombart, who became a Nazi sympa-
thizer and anti-Semite, it was Jews who
created all the negative aspects of capitalism
and modern alienation. For Simmel and
Durkheim, who were born into Jewish fami-
lies, Jewish religion, particularly its more
orthodox forms, was regressive, even an
archaic leftover from the past, though eman-
cipated Jews could also be carriers of moder-
nity. The Chicago sociologists saw Jews pos-
itively as strangers who nevertheless had
adapted to modern urban life so successfully
that they could be models of emerging
modernity and assimilation into American
life.
Karl Marx, whose father had converted to
Protestantism to get a bureaucratic job in
Prussia but who remains identified as a Jew,
is more problematic. It has always been diffi-
cult for those who think of Marx as one of the
greatest of all thinkers to admit that his early
essay on the Jewish Question is a model of
vicious anti-Semitism unredeemed by the
conclusion that Jews had no real religion oth-
er than money and therefore were archetypal
capitalists whose salvation would only come
when capitalism itself was abolished.
There is no doubt that Jews have indeed
played an outsized role in the popular and
intellectual imagination. The French far right
(before being disgraced by its collaboration
with the Nazi occupiers during the Second
World War) not only denied the legitimacy
of the French Revolution but claimed that
the Revolution itself was part of a Jewish
plot to take over the world. Anti-Semites
took it for granted that somehow less than
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